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Using an example from animal cognition, I argue that the problems of 
bias—inherent in choosing null hypotheses or setting Bayesian priors—can 
sometimes be avoided altogether by collecting more and better 
observational data before setting up tests of any sort. 
 
 
Petrinovich shows us that it is all too easy to ‘support’ the null 
hypothesis by carrying out experiments without sufficient power. 
Combined with the—by now, well known—liability of weakly-supported 
experimental hypotheses, no-one can doubt the magnitude of the problem 
with the classical method of statistical analysis. One aspect of it centers on 
the very idea of a null hypothesis. In our statistics classes, we’re taught 
that the null hypothesis should be chosen to reflect the status quo: the 
currently accepted wisdom which our novel hypothesis might overthrow. 
But what is accepted wisdom to some scientists may be heresy to others.  
Take the case of imitation by apes. Nobody doubts that these animals 
learn socially to do things that they would not otherwise have done: the 
controversy has been about how they do it. The behavioral mechanisms of 
stimulus enhancement (Spence, 1937), i.e. seeing another’s actions draws 
attention to a restricted and often key range of stimuli, and social 
facilitation (Zajonc, 1965), i.e. seeing another’s actions increases one’s 
own, are insufficient to explain the apparent copying by apes. Two more-
powerful mechanisms have been proposed: impersonation, sometimes 
called true imitation (Tomasello, 1996), in which the observer copies the 
movements it sees used to achieve an effect also desires itself; and 
emulation (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976), in which the observer works 
towards achieving a goal it has observed another reaching, but uses actions 
from its existing repertoire to do so. Since we’re talking about copying by 
conspecifics, actions used spontaneously are often very similar to those of 
others, so the results of these two, logically distinct processes can look 
more-or-less identical (Tomasello, Davis-Dasilva, Camak, & Bard, 1987). 
So, which should be the null hypothesis, imitation or emulation? To many 
animal behavior researchers, who have observed apes in naturalistic 
enclosures or in the wild, it has seemed obvious that they imitate each 
other quite often, and learn important skills from doing so: the idea of that 
this is all mere emulation would have to be proved. In contrast, for many 
developmental psychologists, imitation sensu impersonation is part of a 
suite of uniquely human abilities that would be remarkable and highly 
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unlikely in a non-human (Tomasello, 1998). The risk is that whichever we 
take to be the null will inevitably be ‘favored’ by the lack of any decent 
evidence against it (Byrne, 2002). 
Taking a Bayesian approach helps a bit but may not get us out of this 
sort of bind. It would certainly help to force attention on those predictions 
of the competing hypotheses that genuinely differ. And it would avoid the 
bias towards retaining the hypothesis we think most acceptable—or would 
it? Someone still has to set the prior probabilities of each hypothesis in a 
Bayesian analysis. In the case of ape copying, the two camps might just 
agree on making the priors equal; in other cases, that is highly unlikely. 
Think of the vexed question of the origin of covid19, and how we would 
compare these hypotheses: (1) escape from a virus lab, either a result of 
casual genetic meddling or biological weapon design; (2) species-hopping 
from a zoological reservoir, facilitated by the horrible conditions of 
animals held in the repugnant ‘wet markets’ of many Chinese cities; (3) 
part of establishing universal mind-control by an evil genius, leading to 
mass implanting of silicon-chip devices by vaccination. Proponents of all 
three accounts do exist, and for the first two they include serious 
scientists; but getting definite evidence against any of them seems quite 
tricky, so choice of priors is likely to influence the result strongly. 
I would like to defend a somewhat heretical suggestion. Journal editors are 
nearly unanimous in insisting on setting out clearly defined hypothesis in 
one’s introduction so that reviewers can evaluate whether the design and 
conclusions answer the questions raised. Is this always a good idea? (Quite 
apart from whether it is always done honestly in advance.) In the case of 
the ape imitation controversy, the dénouement was in fact from a purely 
observational study: a ‘fishing expedition’, in the derogatory phrase. 
Orangutans at a ‘rehabilitation’ facility, where carers work to free ex-
captive apes from any human attachments or acquired habits, some 
individuals were noticed—and carefully recorded—impersonating 
numerous human activities (Russon & Galdikas, 1993), apparently just for 
the fun of it. These activities included washing clothes, sawing wood (with 
a stick), tidying leaves on a forest path into neat little heaps, re-kindling a 
fire with the aid of paraffin decanted into a jug for carrying, canoeing (with 
a stolen boat), and so forth. These were not activities reinforced by 
humans in any way, whether in prior captivity or at the release facility: 
exactly the opposite in the latter case. Nor were they natural actions of 
orangutans: obviously. The sheer quality and quantity of the observational 
data was sufficient to rule out any explanation except a natural ability to 
impersonate.  
I wonder, therefore, how often the poor results of weak design and 
inappropriate use of statistics might have been circumvented altogether by 
devoting more preliminary effort to observing and understanding the 




when ideas like these would (at least in animal behavior) have seemed 
mainstream (cf. Tinbergen, 1959 or Van Lawick-Goodall, 1968). But notice 
the length of those examples, 79 and 131 pages respectively; who nowadays 
would struggle to publish such things, when they could instead be getting 
out lots of ‘'REF-worthyi’, high-impact, Tweetable papers that test some 
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i For more than 40 years, British academic research has been judged by some sort of 
recurring process in which staff, their outputs and apparent impact have been judged by a 
series of committees: the “research assessment exercise” (RAE) and “research excellence 
framework” (REF) are two incarnations. Since funding follows the judgements, there has 
been continual pressure to produce outputs that can easily be judged, e.g. by journal 
impact factor, citations or press coverage. 
